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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER,* Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiffs Prakash H. Patel and Shobha P. Patel appeal 
from an order of the district court granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Sun Company, Inc. ("Sun") 
in a case brought under the Petroleum Marketing Practices 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2801 et seq. ("PMPA" or "Act"). This 
litigation has been ongoing since 1988, and the case has 
been here before, see Patel v. Sun Co., Inc., 63 F.3d 248, 
252 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Patel V"). The gravamen of the Patels' 
complaint, then and now, is that Sun has made an "end 
run" around a provision of the PMPA that requires service 
station franchisors like Sun to make bona fide offers to 
their franchisees before selling the service station premises 
to a third party. See S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, 
assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
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In 1987, Sun sold the land upon which the Patels had 
operated their service station for twenty-two years to an 
unrelated third party, Lancaster Associates ("Lancaster"), 
without first offering it to them. Sun claims that it was not 
required to make a bona fide offer to the Patels because it 
did not terminate their franchise when it sold the property. 
Instead, Sun took a six year leaseback from Lancaster and 
did not disturb the Patels' franchise until that lease expired 
in 1994. Sun contends that six years later it could rely on 
the "expiration of an underlying lease" provision of the 
PMPA, see S 2802(c)(4), which allows franchisors to 
terminate or nonrenew franchises without first making a 
bona fide offer to their franchisees when the leases 
underlying the franchise expire. 
 
The Patels offer four alternative theories under which 
they claim that Sun should be liable for damages for selling 
the premises to Lancaster without first making a bona fide 
offer, despite the leaseback arrangement. First, they argue 
that because the Lancaster-Sun lease was created after the 
inception of the first franchise agreement between Sun and 
the Patels, it does not qualify as an "underlying lease" for 
the purposes of S 2802(c)(4). Therefore, according to the 
Patels, Sun cannot rely on S 2802(c)(4) to skirt the bona fide 
offer requirement in S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I). Second, they 
contend that, even if the Lancaster-Sun lease technically 
fits the S 2802(c)(4) definition of an underlying lease, Sun 
should not be permitted to circumvent the bona fide offer 
requirements simply by delaying the eventual nonrenewal 
date through the use of a leaseback. To the extent that the 
text of the PMPA seems to allow that result, the Patels urge 
us to close that "unintended loophole" by reading a "sale- 
leaseback offer requirement" into the Act. Third, the Patels 
submit that we must inquire into the objective 
reasonableness of Sun's business decision to avoid the 
bona fide offer provision by creating the leaseback with 
Lancaster. Fourth, the Patels assert that, at the very least, 
Sun's decision to create the leaseback must have been 
made subjectively "in good faith and in the normal course 
of business" and not simply to avoid the bona fide offer 
requirement. 
 
Unfortunately for the Patels, none of their arguments 
carry the day. Under a plain reading of the unambiguous 
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text of the Act, we find that the definition of "underlying 
lease" in S 2802(c)(4) is clear, and that it includes leases, 
like the Lancaster-Sun leaseback, created during the 
business relationship between the franchisor and 
franchisee. Additionally, we can find no statutory basis to 
justify reading into the PMPA new provisions like a "sale 
leaseback offer requirement" that have no grounding in the 
Act's text or legislative history. Moreover, our decision in 
Lugar v. Texaco, Inc., 755 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1985), precludes 
the imposition of an objective reasonableness inquiry into 
franchisor decisions to terminate or nonrenew franchises 
based on the underlying lease exception in S 2802(c)(4). 
Finally, while we agree with the Patels that under Slatky v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 830 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc), 
courts must engage in a subjective "in good faith and in the 
normal course of business" review of franchisor decisions to 
terminate or nonrenew the franchise when an underlying 
lease expires, we cannot reverse on this ground. This is 
because we are bound under the doctrine of law of the case 
by the judgment in Patel V, which found that Sun acted in 
good faith when it did not renew the Patels' franchise. For 
all these reasons, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed. 
 
I. 
 
Sun owned a parcel of land in Wayne, Pennsylvania, that 
contained a commercial office building, a large parking 
area, and other improvements. Sun leased a small portion 
of this property to the Patels, who operated a Sunoco 
service station there for twenty two years pursuant to a 
series of franchise agreements with Sun. The first post- 
PMPA agreement between Sun and the Patels began on 
August 21, 1978. 
 
In December of 1987, Sun sold the entire undivided 
parcel, which included the Patels' service station on one 
corner, to Lancaster Associates, an unrelated third party 
developer. It is not clear from the record whether Sun first 
offered the property to the Patels, and so for the purposes 
of summary judgment review we must assume that Sun did 
not. Lancaster agreed to lease the service station portion of 
the parcel back to Sun until September 30, 1994. The 
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Lancaster-Sun leaseback did not, however, contain any 
specific renewal provisions or options granting Sun the 
right to re-purchase the property. 
 
Sun, upon entering into the leaseback with Lancaster, 
and as part of their 1988 Franchise Agreement, 
immediately subleased the service station premises to the 
Patels for a term of three years. The sublease provided that 
Sun's right to grant possession of the premises was now 
subject to the Lancaster-Sun "underlying" lease that would 
expire on September 30, 1994. The sublease also informed 
the Patels that the sublease might not be renewed at the 
end of the lease period. While at no time during the 
Lancaster sale and leaseback did Sun interrupt the Patels' 
possession of the service station premises, according to the 
testimony of Lancaster general partner Bruce Robinson, 
Lancaster always expected that upon the expiration of the 
leaseback, the Patels' franchise would not be renewed 
because Sun had promised to remove the underground fuel 
tanks and clean up any environmental problems that 
existed on the property. 
 
In 1991, upon the expiration of the first three-year 
sublease, Sun and the Patels entered into a second three- 
year sublease due to expire on August 21, 1994. This 
sublease, like the first, provided that Sun's right to grant 
possession of the premises was subject to the underlying 
Lancaster-Sun lease which would expire on September 30, 
1994, and it also informed the Patels that the sublease 
might not be renewed at the end of the lease period. On 
April 28, 1994, Sun sent written notification to the Patels 
that their lease and franchise would not be renewed at the 
end of the term due to the upcoming expiration of Sun's 
underlying lease with Lancaster on September 30, 1994. 
 
Beginning in 1988, the Patels filed a series of lawsuits 
claiming that Sun had effected a constructive termination 
or nonrenewal of their franchise in violation of the PMPA by 
not first offering them the right of first refusal on the 
"leased marketing premises" under the PMPA. See 
SS 2801(9) and 2802(b)(3)(D). The district court rejected the 
Patels' contentions in a series of decisions that ultimately 
concluded that their legal action was premature. The court 
reasoned that even if it were true that Sun had failed to 
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offer the Patels the premises, the other necessary predicate 
act (termination or nonrenewal of the lease) had not yet 
occurred, and indeed, might never occur. See Patel v. Sun 
Ref. & Mktg. Co., No. 88-3958, slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
14, 1988) ("Patel I"); Patel v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 710 F. 
Supp. 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("Patel II"); Patel v. Sun Ref. & 
Mktg. Co., No. 88-3958, 1992 WL 25737, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 7, 1992) ("Patel III"). The Patels did not appeal these 
decisions. 
 
After receiving the notification of nonrenewal from Sun in 
1994, the Patels filed another action, again contending that 
the nonrenewal violated the PMPA because Sun had sold 
the property in 1987 without first giving them an offer to 
purchase it or a right of first refusal. The Patels sought 
injunctive relief to prevent the nonrenewal as well as 
monetary damages for Sun's alleged violation of the PMPA. 
The district court denied the request for injunctive relief 
because it found that the Patels had not satisfied the 
S 2805(b)(2) preliminary injunction standard, which 
requires the franchisee to show "sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits to make such questions a fair 
ground for litigation." Patel v. Sun Co., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 
871, 873-74 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("Patel IV"). 
 
In a divided opinion, we affirmed the district court's 
denial of the injunction, although on different grounds, not 
reaching the merits determination made by the district 
court. See Patel V, 63 F.3d at 252. We held that the 
injunction was barred under S 2805(e)(1), which provides 
that a court may not compel renewal of a franchise 
relationship if the basis for the nonrenewal of the 
relationship was a decision made in good faith and in the 
normal course of business by the franchisor to sell its 
interests in the leased marketing premises. See 
S 2805(e)(1)(A)(iii). We remanded to the district court, 
however, explaining, "[t]he Patels still have. . . the 
opportunity to present to the district court their contention 
that the nonrenewal of their franchise violatesS 2802 
because the reason given for the nonrenewal, the expiration 
of the underlying lease, was a condition created by the 
franchisor when it sold the property without offering the 
franchisee an opportunity to purchase it." Patel V, 63 F.3d 
at 253. 
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On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment, 
and the district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Sun. See Patel v. Sun Co., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996) ("Patel VI"). The Patel VI court held that Sun 
could refuse to renew the Patels' franchise without liability, 
based upon the underlying lease exception in 
SS 2802(b)(2)(C) and 2802(c)(4). The district court relied 
upon our reasoning in Lugar, 755 F.2d at 53, and held that 
the underlying lease exception was not subject to any 
judicial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Sun's 
decision to sell and leaseback the premises. See Patel VI, 
948 F. Supp. at 473 n.3. 
 
The Patels appealed again, and the long-running saga of 
"the Patels versus Sun" returns to this court anew. Section 
2805(a) of the PMPA confers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts and creates a civil cause of action against 
franchisors for violations of the substantive sections of the 
Act. Section 2805(d) provides for the award of actual and 
exemplary damages, as well as reasonable attorney and 
expert witness fees to a franchisee who prevails against a 
franchisor in a civil action under the Act. Because our 
standard of review is plenary, see Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 
F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1996), we apply the same test the 
district court should have applied in the first instance. See 
Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 
1995). We must determine, therefore, whether the record, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Patels, 
shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that Sun was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. See, e.g., Olson, 101 F.3d at 951; Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
The PMPA regulates the relationship between franchisors, 
motor fuel refiners and distributors, and their franchisees, 
principally retail gas station operators. Many of these 
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franchisees (like the Patels) lease their station premises 
from franchisors who (like Sun), own the premises. In 1978, 
after examining this relationship and determining that 
legislative protection for franchisees was necessary, 
Congress enacted the PMPA. Congress passed this 
legislation in large part because it was concerned that 
franchisors had been using their superior bargaining power 
to compel compliance with certain marketing policies and 
to gain an unfair advantage in contract disputes. See 
Slatky, 830 F.2d at 478 (citing S. Rep. No. 731, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 17-19, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 875- 
77) ("Senate Report"); Patel V, 63 F.3d at 250. In addition, 
Congress wanted to protect franchisees from "arbitrary or 
discriminatory terminations and non-renewals." Senate 
Report at 18, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 877. As we noted in 
Slatky, when it passed the PMPA: 
 
       Congress determined that franchisees had a 
       "reasonable expectation[]" that "the [franchise] 
       relationship will be a continuing one." The PMPA's goal 
       is to protect a franchisee's "reasonable expectation" of 
       continuing the franchise relationship while at the same 
       time insuring that distributors have "adequate 
       flexibility . . . to respond to changing market conditions 
       and consumer preferences." 
 
830 F.2d at 478 (citing the Senate Report at 18-19). 
 
The PMPA prohibits franchisors from terminating or 
nonrenewing franchises except under certain prescribed 
situations. See S 2802(a). It also enumerates a series of 
grounds that permit a franchisor to terminate or nonrenew 
one of its franchisees without PMPA liability. See S 2802(b). 
These bases can be roughly separated into two categories: 
franchisee misconduct1 and legitimate franchisor business 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For example, the Act permits the franchisor to terminate or nonrenew 
a franchise if the franchisee fails to pay sums due under the franchise 
agreement, see S 2802(b)(2)(C) (incorporating S 2802(c)(8)); if the 
franchisee engages in fraud or criminal misconduct relevant to the 
operation of the property, see S 2802(b)(2)(C) (incorporating S 
2802(c)(1)); 
if the franchisor receives "numerous bona fide customer complaints" 
about the franchisee's operation of the property, see S 2802(b)(3)(B); or 
if 
the franchisee fails to operate the property in a "clean, safe, and 
healthful manner," see S 2802(b)(3)(C). 
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decisions. In this case, only the latter, which are designed 
to ensure that franchisors maintain their ability to adjust to 
changing market conditions, are implicated. 
 
Among the acceptable business reasons for franchisee 
termination or nonrenewal (assuming that certain 
conditions in the Act are met) are the franchisor's decision 
to leave the geographic market area, see S 2802(b)(2)(E); 
failure of the franchisor and franchisee to agree in good 
faith and in the normal course of business to changes or 
additions to the franchise agreement, see S 2802(b)(3)(A); 
conversion of the property to a use other than sale of motor 
fuel, see S 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(I); material alteration of the 
property, see S 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(II); sale of the premises, see 
S 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(III); unprofitability of the franchise, see 
S 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV); loss of an underlying lease, see 
S 2802(b)(2)(C) (incorporating S 2802(c)(4)); and loss of 
franchisor's right to grant the trademark which is the 
subject of the franchise, see S 2802(b)(2)(C) (incorporating 
S 2802(c)(6)). Of these possible "business reason" 
exceptions, only two -- the sale of the premises and the 
loss of an underlying lease -- are the subject of this appeal. 
We therefore set out their requirements in greater detail. 
 
First, under S 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(III), a franchisor may 
terminate or nonrenew a franchisee if the franchisor 
determines "in good faith and in the normal course of 
business" to sell the property. To qualify for this exception 
to the general prohibition against terminations or 
nonrenewals, however, the franchisor's purpose cannot be 
to convert the property to direct management by its own 
employees or agents. See S 2802(b)(3)(D)(ii). Moreover, the 
franchisor must have made either a bona fide offer to sell 
the property to the franchisee, or, if applicable, have 
provided the franchisee a right of first refusal on an offer 
made to a third party. See S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii). 
 
Second, a franchisor may terminate or decline to renew 
a franchise agreement upon the "occurrence of an event 
which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a 
result of which . . . nonrenewal of the franchise is 
reasonable." S 2802(b)(2)(C). Section 2802(c) expands on the 
general statement in S 2802(b)(2)(C) by enumerating a non- 
exclusive list of events that qualify as "relevant". Included 
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in this list is "loss of the franchisor's right to grant 
possession of the leased marketing premises through 
expiration of an underlying lease." S 2802(c)(4). In 1994, 
Congress amended this exception by requiring a franchisor 
to offer to assign to the franchisee "any option to extend the 
underlying lease or option to purchase the marketing 
premises that is held by the franchisor" when certain 
conditions are satisfied. See Petroleum Marketing Practices 
Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-371, sec. 3, 
S 102(c)(4), 108 Stat. 3484, 3484 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
S 2802(c)(4)(B)). As there were no options in the Lancaster- 
Sun lease, that provision is not relevant to our decision 
here. We will, however, discuss the import of this 
amendment on our PMPA jurisprudence infra. 
 
B. 
 
The Patels' overarching argument is that if Sun is allowed 
to prevail here, it will have made a successful "end run" 
around the bona fide offer requirement contained in the 
sale exception to the PMPA's general rule prohibiting 
franchise nonrenewal. To evaluate this argument, it is 
necessary to understand the interplay between 
SS 2802(b)(3)(D) and 2802(c)(4) (as incorporated by 
S 2802(b)(2)(C)). As we have explained, S 2802(b)(3)(D) 
requires that a franchisor make "a bona fide offer to sell, 
transfer, or assign to the franchisee [his] interests" in the 
leased marketing premises when the franchisor decides not 
to renew the franchise relationship before it sells the 
property to a third party. Thus, the Act contemplates a two- 
event trigger to activate the bona fide offer requirement -- 
a sale of the property and a termination or nonrenewal of 
the franchise. 
 
In the ordinary case, the sale and the nonrenewal occur 
together, and there is no question that the franchisor must 
make a bona fide offer or grant a right of first refusal to the 
franchisee before selling to avoid liability under the Act. But 
the circumstances here are not "ordinary". In 1987, Sun's 
sale of the premises did not lead immediately to its failure 
to renew the Patels' franchise. Rather, Sun took a leaseback 
from Lancaster and renewed the Patels' franchise for not 
just one, but for two additional three year terms. Thus, 
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when Sun sold the property to Lancaster, there was no 
nonrenewal, and the courts in Patel I-III, supra held that 
the right of first refusal and bona fide offer requirements of 
S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii) had not yet been triggered. The Patels 
were told, in effect, to wait and see if their franchise would 
be terminated in the future. See Patel III, 1992 WL 25737 
at *2 ("At this point in time, they have not been subjected 
to a termination or non-renewal of their franchise. If such 
an event occurs, plaintiffs will have the protection of the 
PMPA at their disposal."). The Patels did not appeal these 
decisions. 
 
Barring another exception in the PMPA, Sun could not 
have avoided liability under the PMPA when it ultimately 
decided to nonrenew the Patels just because that 
nonrenewal was delayed through the use of a leaseback (or 
any other device). This is so, because the default regime of 
the Act is that all terminations or nonrenewals are unlawful 
unless otherwise excepted. See S 2802(a). In this case, 
however, when Sun actually failed to renew the Patels' 
franchise in 1994, it contended that a different provision -- 
S 2802(c)(4) -- shielded it from PMPA liability, because the 
expiration of the Lancaster-Sun lease now qualified as a 
relevant event under S 2802(b)(2)(C). Therefore, in Sun's 
view, the sale exception (with its bona fide offer 
requirement) no longer was relevant, for it could now rely 
on the underlying lease exception (which had no bona fide 
offer requirement). These are the mechanics of the "end 
run" of which the Patels complain. 
 
The Patels maintain that the district court should not 
have interpreted the PMPA to permit a franchisor to evade 
the bona fide offer requirement so easily, and they advance 
several theories why Sun should be liable for damages (they 
no longer seek injunctive relief). 
 
1. 
 
First, the Patels submit that the language of S 2802(c)(4) 
itself prohibits franchisors from creating and using 
leasebacks to avoid PMPA liability. They contend that a 
lease cannot be an "underlying lease" for the purposes of 
S 2802(c)(4) unless it predates the business relationship 
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between the franchisor and franchisee (in other words, the 
lease must predate the creation of the initial franchise 
between the parties).2 The Patels argue that a lease that 
merely predates the existing franchise, like the Lancaster- 
Sun leaseback in this case, should not be treated as an 
"underlying lease" because that would permit the 
subversion of the bona fide offer provision contained in the 
sale exception. 
 
We turn initially to the language of S 2802(c)(4) to 
determine what Congress intended by the term "underlying 
lease". The provision reads: 
 
       As used in subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section, the term 
       "an event which is relevant to the franchise 
       relationship and as a result of which termination of the 
       franchise or nonrenewal of the franchise relationship is 
       reasonable" includes events such as -- 
 
       * * * 
 
       (4) loss of the franchisor's right to grant possession of 
       the leased marketing premises through expiration of an 
       underlying lease, if the franchisee was notified in 
       writing, prior to the commencement of the term of the 
       then existing franchise -- (A) of the duration of the 
       underlying lease, and (B) of the fact that such 
       underlying lease might expire and not be renewed 
       during the term of such franchise (in the case of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In the text, we use the words "business relationship" instead of the 
perhaps more common-sensical term "franchise relationship" because we 
wish to avoid any confusion with that term as it is defined in S 2801(2). 
Our use of "business relationship" is intended to connote the entire 
relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee, beginning with 
the inception of the first franchise agreement and ending with the 
termination or nonrenewal of the final franchise agreement. "Franchise 
relationship", in contrast, is defined in S 2801(2) as "the respective 
motor 
fuel marketing or distribution obligations and responsibilities of a 
franchisor and a franchisee which result from the marketing of motor 
fuel under a franchise." Technically, a "franchise relationship", as it is 
defined in the PMPA, is tied to the franchise agreement, which the PMPA 
contemplates will periodically be modified and renewed. As that is not 
the idea we are trying to convey here, we have selected the term 
"business relationship". 
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       termination) or at the end of such term (in the case of 
       nonrenewal);3 
 
There is no definition in the Act itself of the term 
"underlying lease". See S 2801. But the term "franchise" is 
defined, and it helps us determine what Congress meant by 
"underlying lease". A franchise is defined as "any contract 
between a refiner and a distributor, between a refiner and 
a retailer, . . . under which a refiner or distributor . . . 
authorizes or permits a retailer or distributor to use, in 
connection with the sale, consignment, or distribution of 
motor fuel, a trademark which is owned or controlled by 
such refiner . . . ." S 2801(1)(A). It includes "any contract 
under which a retailer or distributor . . . is authorized or 
permitted to occupy leased marketing premises . . . in 
connection with the sale, consignment, or distribution of 
motor fuel under a trademark which is owned or controlled 
by such refiner . . . ." S 2801(1)(B)(i). The statute 
contemplates that the franchise will be renewed (and 
perhaps modified) many times during the life of the 
business relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee. Indeed, other sections of the PMPA anticipate a 
series of relatively short franchise terms between the 
franchisor and franchisee. Section 2802(b)(2)(E), for 
example, permits the franchisor to terminate or nonrenew 
a franchise based upon a decision in good faith and in the 
normal course of business to withdraw from the relevant 
geographic market area, so long as the franchise term is 
three years or longer. 
 
Examining the use of the term "franchise" in the context 
of S 2802(c)(4), particularly the notification provision, the 
Patels' contention that an underlying lease must predate 
the business relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee must be incorrect. Under S 2802(c)(4), the 
expiration of an "underlying lease" qualifies as a relevant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This is the pre-October 1994 version of the statute. It applies here 
because both the 1987 sale and the 1994 nonrenewal occurred prior to 
the amendments enacted in that year. We note that the current version 
of S 2802(c)(4) contains a new subsection (B). The amendment modifies 
the relevant language quoted above only insofar as Congress moved all 
of the language in subsection (B) quoted above into the new subsection 
(A) and added new subheadings. See infra page 21. 
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event exception "if the franchisee was notified in writing, 
prior to the commencement of the term of the then existing 
franchise." S 2802(c)(4) (emphasis supplied). This language 
leaves no doubt that Congress anticipated that an 
underlying lease could arise during the business 
relationship, thereby requiring the franchisor to notify the 
franchisee "prior to the commencement of the then existing 
franchise" in which the franchisor decides to terminate (or 
nonrenew) the franchise. If Congress had intended 
otherwise, the statute would logically have been written to 
require the franchisor to notify the franchisee prior to the 
"inception of the initial franchise" or the"existence of any 
business relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee," rather than the "then existing franchise." The 
words "then existing" are clear and they indicate to us that 
a qualifying underlying lease under S 2802(c)(4) could arise 
during the business relationship, so long as the franchisor 
notifies the franchisee before they enter into the next 
franchise agreement. Moreover, since the term "franchise" 
is used repeatedly throughout the PMPA, and is a defined 
term in S 2801, Congress's choice of language in 
S 2802(c)(4) cannot be ignored by this Court, even given the 
strong pro-franchisee tenor of the PMPA and its legislative 
history. See generally, Slatky, 830 F.2d at 478, 483; Patel 
V, 63 F.3d at 250. 
 
In sum, the plain meaning of the language in S 2802(c)(4), 
when read in context, is clear and we are bound by it. See 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 
(1989) (" `The plain meaning of legislation should be 
conclusive, except in rare cases [in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably 
at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' ") (quoting Griffin 
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). The 
term "underlying lease" refers to leases which underlie the 
franchise term, but not necessarily the entire business 
relationship between the franchisor and franchisee. 
Therefore, under the facts of this case, the Lancaster-Sun 
leaseback was an underlying lease for the purposes of 
S 2802(c)(4) and potentially qualified Sun for an exception 
to PMPA liability. 
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2. 
 
The second theory offered by the Patels is that, even if 
the Lancaster-Sun leaseback falls within the statutory 
definition of an "underlying lease" in S 2802(c)(4), we should 
simply read a new provision -- a so-called "sale-leaseback 
bona fide offer requirement" -- into the PMPA, see Patel VI, 
948 F. Supp. at 473, even though such a provision does 
not exist anywhere in the text or the legislative history of 
the statute. The Patels argue that, given our interpretation 
of Congress's intent to protect the "franchisee's reasonable 
expectations of continuing the franchise" and to "assure the 
franchisee an opportunity to continue to earn a livelihood 
from the property," see Slatky, 830 F.2d at 478, 484, Sun's 
actions are fundamentally at odds with the underlying 
purpose of the PMPA. In their view, Congress inadvertently 
left a "loophole" in the PMPA when it included a bona fide 
offer requirement under the sale provision in 
S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I), but left one out of the underlying lease 
provision in SS 2802(b)(2)(C) and 2802(c)(4). The Patels 
maintain that we would be justified in closing up this 
"loophole" by judicial fiat, because it allegedly permits 
unscrupulous franchisors to evade the bona fide offer 
requirement that Congress imposed on franchisors who 
wish to sell their leased marketing premises out from under 
their franchisees. 
 
The Patels carry a heavy burden in trying to convince us 
that the underlying purposes of the PMPA are so clear and 
conclusive that they justify our imposition of an additional 
requirement which, even the Patels admit, does not exist in 
the plain language of the statute. See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 
242. We have been down this path before and have 
consistently rejected the requests of the Patels and others 
to craft new protections eliminating so-called "gaps" in the 
PMPA. Most recently, in the course of this very litigation, 
we explained that "gap[s] in the provisions of the PMPA 
. . . should be corrected by Congress if Congress decides 
that [they] undermine its intent in passing the PMPA." Patel 
V, 63 F.3d at 253 (discussing the interrelationship between 
the underlying lease and the sale provisions, the same 
sections of the statute at issue here). Moreover, our position 
in Patel V was not novel. In Lugar, for example, we admitted 
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that while there may be many strong policy reasons to read 
new pro-franchisee provisions into the PMPA, it was 
Congress's responsibility to weigh the competing interests 
and make those determinations. See 755 F.2d at 59 ("[W]e 
cannot impose th[e] obligation [requiring franchisors to 
assign purchase options to their franchisees] where 
Congress did not.").4 
 
Where Congress has "undert[aken] the delicate task of 
balancing the competing interests of fuel franchisors and 
their dealers," see id., we cannot impose new obligations on 
franchisors without any statutory basis simply because we 
prefer them, or because there are strong policy reasons for 
their adoption, or because they are pro franchisee. In the 
context of a detailed statutory structure such as the PMPA, 
we simply need much more evidence to satisfy us that 
"literal application of [the] statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." 
Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571. The Act clearly says that a 
franchisor may rely on the expiration of an underlying lease 
as a valid exception to liability under the PMPA, so long as 
the franchisee is notified "prior to the commencement of the 
term of the then existing franchise."S 2802(c)(4) (emphasis 
supplied); see S II.B.1 supra. For the same reasons that we 
are convinced that the Lancaster-Sun leaseback qualifies as 
an "underlying lease" under S 2802(c)(4), we cannot 
conclude that Congress inadvertently omitted creating a 
bona fide offer requirement from the underlying lease 
exception in (c)(4) when the lease is created during the 
business relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee. 
 
As discussed above and detailed in Slatky, the PMPA was 
created to balance the needs of franchisees, who have a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note in this regard that the oil franchisees have demonstrated 
their ability to get Congress's attention. See , e.g., S 2802(c)(4) (as 
amended 1994) (overturning our precedent in Lugar that permitted 
franchisors to rely on the expiration of an underlying lease defense to 
avoid PMPA liability even when their expiring leases contained 
unexercised options to renew or purchase that had never been offered to 
the franchisee); see also H.R. Rep. No. 737, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2779; S. Rep. No. 387, 103d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1994), available at 1994 WL 534750. 
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" `reasonable expectation' of continuing the franchise 
relationship" if they do not engage in any misconduct, with 
the needs of the franchisors, who need " `adequate flexibility 
. . . to respond to changing market conditions and 
consumer preferences.' " 830 F.2d at 478 (quoting Senate 
Report at 19). Given these competing goals that Congress 
attempted to balance, we cannot conclude that the lack of 
a sale-leaseback bona fide offer requirement is 
"demonstrably at odds" with the rest of the PMPA. In fact, 
it appears to fit in comfortably with the rest of the 
provisions of the Act whose purpose it is to maintain 
franchisor flexibility to respond to new competitive 
conditions. Accordingly, we decline the Patels' entreaties to 
read new provisions in the PMPA that are plainly absent 
from the text of the statute and its legislative history. 
 
3. 
 
Sun contends that once we have defined the term 
"underlying lease" to include the Lancaster-Sun leaseback 
and rejected the Patels' suggestions to read new pro- 
franchisee provisions into the text of the PMPA, we must 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in its 
favor. In its submission, all of the events in S 2802(c), 
including the "underlying lease" exception, are per se 
reasonable, obviating the ability of the courts to review the 
circumstances of the creation and expiration of underlying 
leasebacks. To Sun, this per se status means we may 
conduct neither an objective nor a subjective inquiry into 
the events and decisions surrounding the creation of the 
Lancaster-Sun leaseback and the nonrenewal of the Patels' 
franchise under S 2802(c)(4).5 While we agree with Sun that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. An objective inquiry would require us to examine the reasonableness 
of Sun's decision to sell the leased marketing premises to Lancaster and 
take a six year leaseback, without first offering it to the Patels, as 
viewed 
from the perspective of a reasonable business person charged with 
making such decisions. Application of this standard would obviously be 
quite onerous because it would necessitate our reviewing and second- 
guessing the substantive merits of Sun's business decisions about where 
and how to best market its product. A subjective inquiry, however, would 
clearly be less intrusive from Sun's perspective because it only would 
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a franchisor's reliance on S 2802(c)(4) is not subject to an 
objective reasonableness test, we nevertheless also 
conclude that its decision must be subjectively "in good 
faith and in the normal course of business" to qualify for 
the "underlying lease" exception. Here, however, since the 
Patels have produced insufficient evidence to show bad 
faith on Sun's part in either creating the Lancaster-Sun 
leaseback or allowing it to expire, we ultimately conclude 
that Sun can avoid PMPA liability for nonrenewing the 
Patels' franchise under the "underlying lease" exception in 
S 2802(c)(4). 
 
a. 
 
First, we deal with the question whether S 2802(c)(4) is 
subject to an objective reasonableness test. We preface this 
discussion with the acknowledgment that Sun's submission 
that all of the S 2802(c) events are per se reasonable is 
meritless. There is no question that at least some of the 
S 2802(c) relevant event exceptions mandate some form of 
judicial scrutiny. See Sun Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Rago, 741 
F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]n light of the Act's specific 
intent to benefit franchisees, we decline to construe 
S 2802(c) as a per se termination rule favoring 
franchisors."); Lugar, 755 F.2d at 59 (recognizing that a 
reasonableness inquiry into certain enumerated events 
under S 2802(c) dealing with franchisee misconduct was 
proper, but refusing to extend that rationale to S 2802(c)(4)); 
accord Marathon Petroleum v. Pendleton, 889 F.2d 1509, 
1512 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e must scrutinize the 
reasonableness of terminations even when an event 
enumerated in S 2802(c) has occurred."). 
 
Sun's contention that courts are not authorized to second 
guess franchisors' decisions pursuant to the underlying 
lease exception in S 2802(c)(4) is grounded in our holding in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
require us to probe into Sun's state of mind when it decided to create an 
underlying leaseback with Lancaster. Under this standard, our focus 
would be on whether the franchisor entered into the leaseback for 
normal business reasons or simply in an effort to avoid the sale 
exception's bona fide offer requirement in S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I). 
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Lugar that there is no statutory basis to inquire into the 
objective reasonableness of franchisor business decisions 
made in conformity with S 2802(c)(4). See 755 F.2d at 58. 
The Patels challenge the viability of Lugar, arguing that the 
decision is in conflict with our earlier opinion in Rago, 741 
F.2d at 673 (holding that the enumerated events in 
S 2802(c) are not per se reasonable), and that the 1994 
Amendment to S 2802(c)(4) not only overturned Lugar's 
result, but also fatally undermined its reasoning. We 
disagree. 
 
In Lugar, the franchisor, Texaco, had been leasing its gas 
station premises from a third party owner. Texaco in turn 
entered into a series of subleases with plaintiff Howard 
Lugar, its franchisee. The underlying lease granted Texaco 
an option to renew and an option to purchase the property 
at its expiration. When the underlying lease expired, Texaco 
opted neither to renew it nor purchase the premises from 
the third party owner. Texaco then informed Lugar that it 
was not renewing his franchise based upon the expiration 
of the underlying lease. Lugar asked Texaco to assign its 
options to him, so that he could continue his business at 
the same location, but Texaco refused and claimed 
protection from PMPA liability under S 2802(c)(4), the 
underlying lease exception. See Lugar, 755 F.2d at 54. 
 
Lugar sued, alleging that Texaco's reliance on S 2802(c)(4) 
was unreasonable because Texaco should at least have 
assigned its options to him. In effect, Lugar asked the 
Court to make an objective evaluation of the 
reasonableness of Texaco's business decision to refuse to 
assign him its options to renew the lease and purchase the 
property. We held that because Texaco's nonrenewal fit 
within S 2802(c)(4), an enumerated relevant event, the Act 
precluded us from evaluating the reasonableness of 
Texaco's action. See id. at 58. 
 
In Rago, in contrast, the plaintiff had been operating a 
service station for eight years under a series of franchise 
agreements with the same franchisor. With two years 
remaining before the expiration of the then existing 
franchise agreement, the franchisor sent Rago a letter 
informing him that it intended to terminate his franchise. 
The franchisor's stated reasons were that Rago had failed to 
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operate the station for a period of ten consecutive days and 
also that he had failed to pay rent and other sums due the 
franchisor in a timely manner. See Rago, 741 F.2d at 671. 
The franchisor relied on SS 2802(c)(8) and (9)(A) to avoid 
PMPA liability.6 Although the franchisee had committed a 
literal violation of these provisions, we held that S 2802(c) 
was not a per se termination rule and proceeded to analyze 
whether the circumstances surrounding the Rago's failures 
made it reasonable for the franchisor to terminate his 
franchise. See id. at 674. 
 
Contrary to the Patels' reading of Lugar and Rago, we 
perceive no conflict between the two opinions. As the panel 
in Lugar made clear, there is a patent difference between 
S 2802(c)(4), which deals with nonrenewal based upon a 
franchisor business judgment, and SS 2802(c)(8) and (9)(A), 
which concern nonrenewals based upon franchisee 
misconduct. Specifically, because (c)(8) and (9)(A) deal with 
"failures" by franchisees to do certain things (e.g., pay 
money in a timely manner and operate the service station 
for ten consecutive days), they therefore necessarily 
implicate S 2801(13), which defines the term "failure". See 
Lugar, 755 F.2d at 58 n.3. Because the term "failure" under 
the PMPA does not include "any failure for a cause beyond 
the reasonable control of the franchisee," S 2801(13)(B) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Sections 2802(c)(8) and (9) allow the franchisor to terminate or 
nonrenew a franchisee for franchisee misconduct. In the context of 
S 2802(c), they read: 
 
       As used in subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section, the term "an event 
       which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a result of 
       which termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the franchise 
       relationship is reasonable" includes events such as -- 
 
* * * 
 
       (8) failure by the franchisee to pay to the franchisor in a timely 
       manner when due all sums to which the franchisor is legally 
       entitled; 
       (9) failure by the franchisee to operate the marketing premises for 
       -- 
 
       (A) 7 consecutive days, or 
       (B) such lesser period which under the facts and circumstances 
       constitutes an unreasonable period of time; . . . 
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(emphasis supplied), the Rago panel was undoubtedly 
correct to question whether there were any reasonable 
excuses justifying Rago's failures to keep his station open 
and pay his rent on time. Similarly, because S 2802(c)(4) 
justifies nonrenewal on the basis of the expiration of an 
underlying lease, not a franchisee "failure", the Lugar 
panel's refusal to engage in a reasonableness inquiry is 
equally understandable. 
 
Nor are we convinced by the Patels' argument that the 
1994 Amendment to S 2802(c)(4), which disturbed our 
result in Lugar, constitutes a legislative repeal of its 
rationale. Under the amendment, franchisors must now 
offer to assign to their franchisees all options to extend 
underlying leases as well as any options to purchase the 
marketing premises, when certain conditions are met. See 
S 2802(c)(4)(B) (as amended 1994).7  While Sun concedes 
that the amendment overrules Lugar's result, it submits 
that Lugar's reasoning remains intact. If anything, Sun 
contends, because the amendment only narrowly revised 
S 2802(c)(4), and did not specifically require courts to 
evaluate the objective reasonableness of franchisor 
decisions not to renew franchises based upon the 
expiration of underlying leases, Congress implicitly 
approved Lugar's reasoning and simply clarified the 
circumstances when the expiration of an underlying lease is 
statutorily reasonable. While this question is difficult, 
because we find nothing in the text of the amendments or 
in the accompanying legislative history to the contrary, see 
H.R. Rep. No. 737, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2779; S. Rep. No. 387, 103d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1994), available at 1994 WL 534750; 140 Cong. 
Rec. H10,575-76 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994); 140 Cong. Rec. 
H10,735 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994); 140 Cong. Rec. S14,236- 
37 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994), we believe Sun's 
characterization of Congress's intent to be more plausible, 
and we reject the Patels' attempts to graft a reasonableness 
test onto S 2802(c)(4) in direct conflict with our existing 
precedent. Therefore, we find that the 1994 Amendment to 
S 2802(c)(4) did not disturb our holding in Lugar that there 
is no objective reasonableness test under that section. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Because of its length, we do not rescribe that amendment here. 
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b. 
 
Our analysis of S 2802(c)(4) is not yet complete, however, 
because Sun contends that not only can there be no 
objective reasonableness inquiry into business decisions 
made pursuant to this section, but also that there can be 
no judicial inquiry whatever. The Patels, in contrast, urge 
that, based upon our decision in Slatky, we must consider 
whether Sun created the leaseback with Lancaster 
subjectively "in good faith and in the normal course of 
business." 
 
In Slatky, the franchisee had leased his gas station from 
Amoco for several years. After Slatky's sales had declined, 
Amoco decided not to renew his franchise on the ground 
that renewal would be uneconomical. To avoid PMPA 
liability, Amoco based its nonrenewal on 
S 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV), which allows nonrenewal when 
"renewal of the franchise relationship is likely to be 
uneconomical to the franchisor despite any reasonable 
changes or reasonable additions to the provisions of the 
franchise which may be acceptable to the franchisee." This 
provision, like the sale of the marketing premises provision, 
requires the franchisor to make a bona fide offer to sell the 
premises to the franchisee. See S 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(I). 
 
In an attempt to satisfy this requirement, Amoco offered 
to sell the property to Slatky at what Slatky claimed was an 
unreasonable price, one significantly higher than the 
property's fair market value. See Slatky, 830 F.2d at 480. 
Amoco contended that to qualify as a "bona fide offer", it 
need only have made a subjectively sincere offer in good 
faith. Slatky countered that the offer must have been 
objectively reasonable. As the provision had no explicit 
standard, we conducted an independent inquiry into the 
bona fide offer requirement and, utilizing the logic 
discussed below, determined that an objective 
reasonableness standard applied. 
 
We reasoned as follows. Since the PMPA is a remedial 
statute, enforcement of its provisions demands at least a 
minimal level of judicial involvement. With the enactment of 
the statute, Congress outlawed all franchisee terminations 
and nonrenewals generally, but then created certain 
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exceptions. Congress bifurcated these exceptions into two 
broad categories: (1) franchisee misconduct, and (2) 
franchisor business judgments. See id. at 481; see also 
supra S II.A. The Act generally contemplates an objective 
reasonableness inquiry into terminations and nonrenewals 
based upon franchisee misconduct, and a subjective "in 
good faith and in the normal course of business" inquiry 
into franchisor business judgment cases. See id. We 
examined provisions which, like the bona fide offer 
requirement, did not contain explicit standards for judicial 
inquiry and determined that the courts must first 
categorize them in order to determine the proper inquiry. 
Ultimately, we concluded that since the determination of an 
offer price pursuant to the bona fide offer requirement was 
not a business determination, but rather a decision made 
by the franchisor "only because the statute requires it to do 
so," it was more akin to a franchise misconduct provision. 
We therefore applied an objective reasonableness standard. 
See id. 
 
In assessing the impact of our analysis in Slatky, it is 
critical to understand that although we noted (and 
enforced) the legislative intent to distinguish between 
franchisee misconduct and franchisor business decisions, 
our decision was predicated on the fact that both types of 
decisions warranted some type of judicial inquiry. Although 
Slatky concluded by applying an objective standard to the 
provision it considered, the impact of its analytical 
framework here is to mandate the application of a 
subjective good faith standard to the franchisor's decision 
to create a leaseback under S 2802(c)(4). As with the bona 
fide offer requirement at issue in Slatky, the underlying 
lease provision contains no explicit judicial inquiry 
standard. Therefore, we look to the nature of that provision 
to determine what standard is appropriate, and conclude 
that the decision to create an underlying lease (by selling 
the leased marketing premises and entering into leaseback) 
is a franchisor marketing decision (not unlike the decisions 
to sell the premises or withdraw from the relevant 
geographic market area). In contrast with the bonafide 
offer requirement, it is not based upon "a right created by 
the PMPA," and it is not analogous to a situation where a 
franchisee is terminated or nonrenewed for misconduct. See 
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Slatky, 830 F.2d at 481. Therefore, the underlying lease 
provision contained in S 2802(c)(4) warrants the more 
lenient "in good faith and in the normal course of business" 
inquiry, not the objective reasonableness standard that is 
reserved for franchisor non-business decisions. 
 
Our conclusion that S 2802(c)(4) requires the franchisor 
to act in good faith and in the normal course of business is 
buttressed by the legislative history. The Senate Report 
states: 
 
       Expiration of the underlying lease could occur under a 
       variety of circumstances including, for example, a 
       decision by the franchisor not to exercise an option to 
       renew the underlying lease. However, it is not intended 
       that termination or nonrenewal should be permitted 
       based upon the expiration of a lease which does not 
       evidence the existence of an arms length relationship 
       between the parties and as a result of the expiration of 
       which no substantive change in control of the premises 
       results. 
 
Senate Report at 38, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 896 (emphasis 
supplied). This passage illustrates several important points. 
First, Congress could not have meant S 2802(c)(4) to be a 
per se termination rule because Congress has specifically 
pointed out in the Senate Report at least one instance 
where the expiration of an underlying lease will not excuse 
the franchisor from liability for nonrenewing or terminating 
a franchise. Sun's argument that the preceding "snippet" of 
legislative history is consistent with a per se termination 
rule under S 2802(c)(4) (because it only says that non-arms 
length leases are not covered) is unconvincing -- either 
S 2802(c)(4) is a per se rule or it is not, and Congress has 
told us that it is not. 
 
Moreover, this legislative history seems to posit the kind 
of nonrenewal that appears to have occurred in Lugar (and, 
indeed in every other S 2802(c)(4) underlying lease case 
cited by Sun) -- namely, the expiration of an underlying 
lease that predates the inception of the business 
relationship between the franchisor and franchisee.8 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The viability of a limited-in-scope good faith test was not discussed 
in 
Lugar, and application of one here would arguably be in tension with 
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legislative history does not, however, seem to contemplate 
a situation where (as here) the franchisor creates the 
"underlying lease" by selling the premises out from under 
the franchisee and taking a leaseback. Therefore, while the 
language of the statute permits these kinds of leasebacks, 
see S II.B.1 supra, given the potential for abuse, unfairness, 
and arbitrariness such practices could engender, we believe 
that this is exactly the sort of situation in which Congress 
sought to protect franchisees from franchisor bad faith. See 
Slatky, 830 F.2d at 482 (noting that the PMPA requires a 
good faith inquiry into franchisor business decisions to 
prevent sham transactions) (citing Senate Report at 37, 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 896). 
 
Accordingly, we hold that, in the narrow circumstance 
where a franchisor has created a underlying lease through 
a sale-leaseback that takes place after the creation of the 
business relationship between the franchisor and 
franchisee, a subjective "in good faith and the normal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
some of our language in that opinion, see, e.g., Lugar, 755 F.2d at 58 
("It 
is of some significance that even where Congress did subject certain 
franchisor's decisions to judicial scrutiny, it eschewed a broad 
`reasonable business judgments' test," and instead adopted a two-fold in 
good faith and in the normal course of business test.). Lugar is 
distinguishable, however, because the underlying lease at issue there 
differed in an important way from the Patels' lease in that it predated 
the 
entire business relationship between Lugar and Texaco, rather than just 
the then extant franchise term. See Lugar, 755 F.2d at 54. Since Lugar 
knew that Texaco was leasing the property from a third party (and also 
knew that the lease might expire during his franchise relationship) when 
he first decided to contract with Texaco, the Court did not have to 
consider the possibility that Texaco might have acted in bad faith in 
creating the underlying lease. In contrast, since Sun created the lease 
during the franchise relationship here, it is at least conceivable that 
Sun 
could have done so in a bad faith effort to avoid the bona fide offer 
requirement of the sale exception. While the Patels' efforts to show that 
Sun acted in bad faith or outside of the ordinary course of business fail 
here, see infra, given the right factual predicate, a future plaintiff 
might 
prevail on this theory. Moreover, while the cited language might be read 
to indicate that the Lugar panel believed that S 2802(c)(4) was not one of 
the provisions to which Congress meant to apply the two-fold subjective 
test, the objective reasonableness issue was the only one before the 
Court. 
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course of business" inquiry should be applied under 
S 2802(b)(2)(C) and S 2802(c)(4), before the franchisor will be 
exempted from liability under the PMPA when its franchisor 
challenges the nonrenewal of its lease. If this inquiry is to 
have any effect at all, it must include the circumstances 
surrounding both the creation of the underlying lease and 
its eventual expiration. We can hypothesize several 
instances in which franchisor conduct at the time it created 
the underlying lease would not satisfy this test and 
therefore would not qualify under S 2802(c)(4). Most 
obviously, as specifically contemplated in the legislative 
history, a franchisor who failed to make a bona fide offer to 
its franchisee would be liable for damages under the PMPA 
if it sold the leased marketing premises and created an 
underlying lease as part of a sham transaction that was not 
at arms length. Also, an inference of bad faith could be 
drawn by the fact finder if the franchisor executed a sale 
with a very short-term leaseback (on the order of a few 
months) and then attempted to terminate the franchisee 
without liability based on that extremely short underlying 
lease. Or, a court could find bad faith if the franchisor used 
the sale-leaseback gambit to terminate one franchise, only 
to enter into a new agreement with a different franchisee. 
Finally, an inference of bad faith might properly be drawn 
if the fact finder concluded that the franchisor intended to 
terminate the business relationship when it sold the 
premises, but that it took a leaseback (of any duration) 
simply to avoid the bona fide offer requirement. 
 
4. 
 
The Patels have alleged neither a sham transaction nor a 
suspiciously short leaseback, and Sun has not entered into 
a new franchise agreement to market motor fuel at the 
Patels' old franchise location with different franchisees. In 
fact, the only evidence the Patels put forth that might 
support a claim of bad faith is Lancaster general partner 
Bruce Robinson's testimony that Sun intended to terminate 
their franchise in 1987 at the time of the sale. The district 
court, however, found that this was insufficient evidence of 
bad faith to create a triable issue of fact. See Patel VI, 948 
F. Supp. at 475-76 & 477 n.6 ("No evidence has been 
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shown that Sun acted out of any bad faith desire to defeat 
the Patel's rights under the PMPA."). Given that Sun leased 
the premises to the Patels for over six years after selling it 
to Lancaster, this slender reed would not seem to be 
enough to satisfy the Patels' burden opposing summary 
judgment had we been presented with this issue in the first 
instance. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (noting that the 
non-moving party creates a genuine issue of material fact 
only by providing sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable 
jury to return a verdict in his favor). 
 
Moreover, as we have already noted, a previous panel of 
this Court has already definitively ruled on the question of 
Sun's bad faith, and we are bound by its decision as law of 
the case. In Patel V, the panel denied a motion by the 
Patels for a preliminary injunction based upon S 2805(e)(1), 
which "bars an injunction that would require a franchisor 
to continue a franchise in a location which the franchisor, 
in good faith and in the normal course of business, has 
decided to sell." 63 F.3d at 252. By grounding its 
affirmance in S 2805(e)(1), the prior panel a fortiori also 
concluded that the transaction was made in good faith and 
in the normal course of business. See id. at 253 & n.8. This 
determination by an earlier panel constitutes the law of the 
case, and we are barred from reconsidering it. See Atlantic 
Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of Atlantic County, 112 F.3d 652, 663 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citations omitted).9 
 
C. 
 
The Patels make one final argument that merits our 
analysis. They contend that the prior panel, while rejecting 
their request for injunctive relief, also decided the merits of 
the damage claim in their favor. The Patels base this 
contention on the next to the last paragraph in Section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. There are three traditional exceptions to this doctrine, including 
situations in which: (1) new evidence is available; (2) a supervening new 
law has been announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly 
erroneous and would create manifest injustice. See Public Interest 
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 
F.3d 111, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). None of these apply. 
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III(B) of Patel V. See 63 F.3d at 253. There, the majority 
stated: 
 
       Clearly, one cannot help but feel some sympathy for 
       the Patels. At the time of their initial attempt to obtain 
       injunctive relief, they were sent away and told to seek 
       such relief when their franchise was not renewed. Now, 
       having returned to court after the occurrence of the 
       nonrenewal, they are told that they are not eligible for 
       injunctive relief. The Patels still have, however, the 
       opportunity to present to the district court their 
       contention that the nonrenewal of their franchise 
       violates S 2802 because the reason given for 
       nonrenewal, the expiration of the underlying lease, was 
       a condition created by the franchisor when it sold the 
       property without offering the franchisee an opportunity 
       to purchase it. Even if injunctive relief is no longer 
       available to the Patels, the PMPA does provide for 
       awards of damages and fees to a franchisee who is 
       successful in a civil action against a franchisor. 15 
       U.S.C. 2805(d) and (e). 
 
Id. In the footnote following this passage, the Patel V 
majority continued: 
 
       The dissent states that "[t]he majority holds that the 
       franchisor's obligation to offer to sell to the franchisee 
       can be avoided simply by postponing the nonrenewal or 
       termination of the franchise to a time subsequent to 
       the title closing." Dissent op. at 253; see also id. at 258 
       ("The majority opinion, however, holding that a sale- 
       without-offer followed by expiration of an underlying 
       lease makes nonrenewal reasonable, allows franchisors 
       to completely dispense with the bona fide offer 
       requirement."). We do not so hold. Instead, we hold 
       that a franchisor that fails to offer the property to its 
       franchisee before selling to another is liable to the 
       franchisee for damages, but may not be enjoined from 
       the sale, provided the transaction is made in good faith 
       and in the normal course of business, with the 
       requisite notice. 
 
Id. at 253 n.8 (emphasis supplied). Although the 
highlighted language in the quoted footnote from Patel V 
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purports to "hold" that a franchisor that fails to offer its 
property to the franchisee before selling "is liable" without 
regard to the franchisor's good faith (or even an inquiry into 
the objective reasonableness of the nonrenewal)-- in other 
words that there is a "sale-leaseback offer requirement" 
implicit in the PMPA which nullifies the lease-expiration 
defense set forth in S 2802(c)(4) -- we conclude that that 
statement is dictum, and we decline to follow it.10 
 
The issue before the Court in Patel V was "whether 
injunctive relief is still an available remedy for[the Patels] 
against [Sun]." 63 F.3d at 249. To that end, the Court 
determined that S 2805(e)(1) barred the preliminary 
injunction the Patels sought because Sun had acted in 
good faith and in the ordinary course of business. See id. 
at 252. Nothing in Patel V's footnote eight was integral to 
our holding there; in fact, the footnote itself appears to 
have been drafted in response to criticism from the dissent 
about issues that were not directly before us. A statement 
such as this is dictum. See Sarnoff v. American Home Prods. 
Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986) (defining dictum 
as "a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been 
deleted without seriously impairing the analytical 
foundations of the holding -- that, being peripheral, may 
not have received the full and careful attention of the court 
that uttered it").11 Based upon these circumstances, 
combined with our observation that the majority in Patel V 
engaged in no analysis of the Patels' novel claim for 
damages under S 2802 (in contrast with its detailed 
discussion of the availability of injunctive relief), we do not 
regard the highlighted language in footnote eight of Patel V 
as controlling. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We note that Judge Scirica, who was a member of that panel, joins 
in this opinion. 
 
11. As dictum, there are many reasons why we should not give it weight 
here: (1) it may not have been as fully considered as it would have been 
if it were essential to the outcome; (2) sloughing it off in a new opinion 
will not affect the analytic structure of the original opinion; and (3) 
the 
dictum may lack refinement because it was not honed through the fires 
of an adversary presentation. See United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 
291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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III. 
 
In conclusion, we find that Sun's decision to create an 
underlying lease through a sale-leaseback that took place 
after the creation of the business relationship was subject 
to an "in good faith and the normal course of business" 
inquiry under SS 2802(b)(2)(C) and 2802(c)(4) before it could 
be exempted from liability under the PMPA. We also 
conclude that Sun has already satisfied that test because 
the Patels have adduced insufficient evidence of bad faith. 
The judgment of the district court will therefore be affirmed. 
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